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Abstract 
This study analysed the effect on the wage gap of women´s access to supervisory jobs 
within each establishment in the Spanish labour market. Previous empirical studies have 
found that the promotion of women has a positive effect on the wage difference between 
genders. However, these studies did not take into account the endogeneity problem 
associated with job choice. We proposed a specific econometric specification to control for 
this problem under certain assumptions. Using matched employer-employee data from a 
sample of 213,709 workers, we found that an increase in the proportion of women among 
supervisors within each establishment significantly widens the wage difference between 
genders, but increases the presence of women in supervisory positions. This study shows 
that the impact of an increase in women´s power within establishments may well be more 
limited than other empirical studies suggest. 
Keywords: Endogeneity problem, probit, supervisory jobs, switching model. 
JEL Codes: J16, J32, J71,  
1. Introduction 
The proportion of women in management has increased significantly during the last twenty 
years (Cohen and Huffman, 2007). As pointed out by Marini (1989) and Baron (1991), 
managers and supervisors have a direct influence over organizational procedures and 
policies as well as over every day decision-making, which in turn has effects on inequality in 
rewards between men and women. For this reason, a number of theoretical studies have 
analysed the effects of women's career advancement on other women´s career paths.  
A variety of institutional and theoretical arguments have suggested that an increase in 
women's power has a positive influence on other women´s labour market outcomes. Based 
on Becker's (1957) theory of a taste for discrimination, female managers may pay other 
women more because they will be less likely to discriminate against female workers than 
male managers. This would not occur if workers and jobs were homogeneous, but in 
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practice they are heterogeneous. Female managers may place other women in more 
favourable positions with somewhat higher pay. In fact, it has been found that female 
managers have a greater tendency than their male counterparts to actively promote 
measures aimed at establishing employment equity at the workplace (Baron, 1991). 
Statistical discrimination models suggest that differences in the treatment of men and 
women based on imperfect information about women´s abilities will decrease as women 
advance within organizations ladders (Phelps, 1972). 
Sociologists have also extensively investigated the influence of the gender of managers on 
their subordinates´ outcomes. For example, Cotter et al. (1997) and Nelson and Bridges 
(1999) suggested that gender differences in earnings within organizations should decrease 
whenever there are more women in positions of authority who make crucial decisions 
about salaries, promotion, hiring, and firing. Likewise, Hultin and Szulkin (2003) suggested 
that sex-differentiated networks of friendships, communication, and trust may be a 
mechanism by which gender inequality in reward outcomes are generated within 
organizations. They argue that individual female employees in general have better chances 
to benefit from network ties in organizations in which men do not dominate the decision-
making strata. Furthermore, Kanter (1977), Ibarra (1992), and McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook (2001) use the term “homophily” for the tendency of women to hire other 
women. Similarly, Halpert, Wilson, and Hickman (1993) consider that women who evaluate 
potential female job candidates are less subject to pregnancy-related bias. 
Other sociological researches have studied the role of women´s power to encourage other 
women to occupy supervisory jobs requiring specific educational investments. In particular, 
Polavieja (2012) suggested that job investment decisions involve intentional microlevel 
actions that are themselves influenced by the social environment in which individuals are 
embedded, i.e., by the actions and outcomes experienced by other actors. When actors face 
greater uncertainty and informational constraints when pondering different investment 
options, and when the risks involved in the investment decision itself are greater, the actors 
will be more likely to rely on their social contexts in the search for clues. Women face 
greater constraints and uncertainties than men and confront harsher work-family trade-
offs. This makes their investment choices particularly sensitive to the social environment. 
For this reason, women´s expectations about future returns of their educational 
investments can be influenced by the proportion of women in jobs with supervisory tasks.  
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In a similar vein, some studies have analysed the role of discrimination and social closure in 
hindering women´s access to firm-provided training (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 2002; 
Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Mun, 2010). According to these studies, gender differences in 
specialized skills are the result of the active role played by individual actors with more 
power (i.e. male employers, male co-workers, and male supervisors) in excluding status 
inferiors (i.e. women) from the best and most desired jobs, which tend to be those 
requiring specific training (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 2002, p. 109). The resulting 
underrepresentation of women in supervisory jobs signals other female workers that there 
are gender-specific barriers and constraints associated with job specialization in the firm 
they belong to. 
Finally, classic socialization approaches have focussed on the cultural transmission of sex-
specific values, norms, and orientations, and have investigated the effect of holding 
traditional gender views on the labour market (Reskin, 1993; Reskin and Bielby, 2005). 
More recent sociological contributions have investigated the social interaction processes 
that help recreate gender-specific status beliefs (Ridgeway and Erickson, 2000; Ridgeway 
and Correll, 2004) as well as gender-biased expectations regarding self-competence (Correll 
2001, 2004). These belief-formation approaches explain gender differences in job allocation 
even under conditions of attitudinal convergence between men and women. Workers with 
supervisory tasks within each firm play an important role in transmitting norms, values, and 
orientations within each firm. Thus, the gender of workers in these supervisory jobs can 
affect significantly job allocation within each firm. 
Despite the previous arguments in favour of an increase in women´s access to managerial 
positions, two assumptions must hold in order for female managers to reduce workplace 
inequality. Firstly, female managers must be motivated to act in the interests of subordinate 
women. Second, they must have sufficient power to decrease gender inequality by 
improving their subordinates´ outcomes. The motivations of female managers may be 
affected by two potential sources of loyalty or identity: their female peers in subordinate 
class positions and their managerial peers and superiors (Cohen and Huffman, 2007). Class 
is a source of distinction that could prevent the expression of collective identity among 
women (Young, 1994). In fact, a selection process may operate such that female workers 
are promoted into management partly because of their affinity with the existing hierarchy. 
Furthermore, some women share men´s biased views of women´s work (Deaux, 1985). 
Thus, the potential for female managers to act against inequality may be limited.  
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The managerial power assumption may also be unsound. It is not obvious that managers, 
especially those working in bureaucratic organizations, are able to act autonomously on the 
basis of their own or women´s interests. In fact, they may be compelled to act under the 
mandates of routinization, efficiency, or profitability or according to the prejudices of those 
heading the hierarchy (Merton, 1940). Kanter (1977) suggested that female managers 
occupy weak structural positions and Ridgeway (1997) suggested that they are handicapped 
by their lower power and by interactional gender mechanisms. In fact, the increase in 
women holding managerial positions may reflect the fact that some non-managerial 
workers have been reclassified as managers with little increase in pay or authority (Jacobs, 
1992).  
In summary, female managers may enhance the labour market prospects of women in non-
managerial positions. Their homophilous preferences or affiliations and their role as a 
benchmark for other women may promote equality. Furthermore, women may be more 
aware than men of discriminatory practices and may be less susceptible to cognitive 
processes leading to gender bias. In contrast, bureaucracy, market pressures, divided 
loyalties, past discrimination, or the mandates of those with more power within the firm 
may dilute women´s managerial power to confront inequality. 
Despite these arguments, few empirical studies have analysed the effect of the sex 
composition of managers or supervisors on the gender wage gap among their subordinates. 
For example, Hulting and Szulkin (2003) found that in Sweden the gender pay gap among 
workers without any managerial or supervisory responsibilities was lower in firms with a 
higher share of women among supervisors, whereas the proportion of women among 
managers had no effect on the gap. Additionally, Cohen and Huffman (2007) found that in 
the USA the gender pay gap among non-managerial workers is lower in industries with a 
large share of women in management occupations, although their data did not allow them 
to investigate this finding at the firm level. Using linked employer-employee data for 
Portugal and controlling for employment segregation by including firm fixed effects, Rute-
Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010) found a lower gender pay gap in female-led firms than 
in male-led firms. However, gender segregation was not fully controlled for in this paper. 
Similarly, Hirsch (2013) found that an increase in the female share in first-level 
management by 10 percentage points decreased the unexplained within-job gender pay gap 
in Germany by 0.5 log points. The effect was more pronounced for the female share in 
second-level management than in first-level management. However, Hirsch (2013) did not 
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have information on working hours and therefore had to study the effect of the female 
share in management jobs on daily wages. 
Other papers have analysed the effects of women´s representation in the top levels of firm 
hierarchies on managers´ outcomes. For example, Bell (2005) showed that the gender pay 
gap among top executives was significantly lower in women-led firms than in other firms. 
However, this was not the case when controlling for specific occupational titles. 
Furthermore, Bell (2005) found that the difference between the pay of men and women in 
companies with a high share of women board members is even larger than in firms with no 
female members. Finally, Elkinawy and Stater (2011) found that the gender difference in 
salary is larger in firms with more male-dominated boards. 
In addition, some authors have investigated the effect of an increase in the proportion of 
female supervisors on gender segregation. For example, Baron (1991), Baron, Mittman and 
Newman (1991), Carrington and Troske (1995), and Cohen, Broschak and Haveman 
(1998) have suggested that women´s access to managerial positions decreases gender 
segregation and lowers the barriers to other women accessing to top positions within their 
firms. Likewise, Bell (2005) showed that women leaders help women gain access to the 
highest ranks in the firm. Lastly, Elkinawy and Stater (2011) observed that firms with more 
male-dominated boards have fewer female executives in top managerial positions. 
Nevertheless, all of these results may be biased due to the endogeneity of job choices. In 
fact, unmeasured variables could drive both the gender wage gap and the representation of 
women in management. Few studies have taken into account this endogeneity problem. In 
a randomized experiment, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2007) investigated recruitment 
committees for Spanish public service positions and found that female recruiters treated 
female candidates more unfavourably. Using a similar experiment, Broder (1993) found 
that female reviewers of economics proposals for National Science Foundation grants 
awarded lower grades to women than to men. Thus, results can be strongly affected by 
taking into account endogenous decisions on job allocation. 
The main aim of this paper was to measure the effect of the gender composition of 
supervisory jobs on the gender wage gap and on the probability of holding a supervisory 
job. On the one hand, we used a probit model to obtain the determinants of each worker´s 
choice of job status. On the other hand, we used a switching model to estimate the effect 
of an increase in the proportion of female supervisors on the gender wage gap among 
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supervisors and non-supervisors. Unlike previous studies, these estimations allowed us to 
control for the endogeneity problem previously mentioned. 
Hence, this study contributes to previous empirical literature in three different ways. First, 
using the probit model, we investigated whether a greater proportion of women among 
supervisors reduces other women´s barriers to these better posts by controlling for a 
relevant set of explanatory variables which affects the type of job chosen. Second, using the 
switching model, we compared the effects on the wage gap of women´s access to 
supervisory jobs for supervisors and for non-supervisors. Finally, we broke down the 
effects of the gender composition of supervisory jobs on the wage gap into several 
components. The direct effect was the impact of women´s representation among 
supervisors on the wage difference between men and women within the same job. The 
indirect effects included the impact of more women reaching supervisory posts on the 
wage gap induced by its impact on each type of gender segregation. For example, the 
presence of more women in supervisory jobs in male-dominated establishments and 
industries, where wages are higher, might encourage other women to seek jobs there. This 
would reduce these types of gender segregation and therefore the wage gap that they would 
prompt. Similarly, a greater percentage of women  in supervisory jobs might reduce the 
barriers women face in jobs that are mainly dominated by men (which are better paid), thus 
reducing occupational segregation within each establishment and the resulting gender wage 
gap. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section outlines the econometric 
methodology; Section 3 describes the data sources; Section 4 shows the main empirical 
results; Section 5 analyses the robustness of these results; some concluding comments are 
provided in the final section. 
2. Methodological framework 
2.1. Econometric Specification 
This section describes the methodology applied to estimate the impact of an increase in the 
proportion of women with supervisory jobs within an establishment on the wage gap and 
on the effect of different types of gender segregation on the wage difference. We assume 
that each individual makes his or her decisions in two stages. First, if a worker is offered a 
supervisory job, he or she will have to choose whether to accept or reject it. Second, each 
worker will receive a wage depending on his or her choice. 
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Each individual will accept an offer of a supervisory job if and only if his or her reservation 
wage is lower than the wage offered, that is, 
         (1) 
where  is worker i´s reservation wage for accepting a supervisory job, whereas  is 
the wage offered to individual i in job k within the establishment j in the industry h for 
accepting a supervisory post. We assume that the reservation wage depends on each 
worker´s personal characteristics, whereas the wage offered by the firm depends on the 
industry, establishment, and job characteristics as well as on each worker´s personal 
characteristics. Equation (1) can be expressed as: 
   (2) 
Where  is a dummy variable equal to one when the worker is a man and equal to zero 
otherwise,  denotes a vector of individual characteristics,  denotes industry, 
establishment, job, and individual characteristics, ,  includes unobservable 
characteristics which affect the reservation wage and the wage offered, respectively, , , 
, ,  and are the vectors of parameters. Equation (2) can be expressed as: 
     (3) 
where  represents the supervisory status of each worker, and 1(.) is the indicator 
function which is unity whenever the statement in brackets is true, , 
which is a row vector, , , , which is a column vector, 
and , which is assumed to be independent of  and  with a 
standard normal distribution. Each worker´s wage will depend on his or her chosen 
supervisory status: 
 if    (4) 
 if    (5) 
where  is the logarithm of the observed wage of each worker,  is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a worker is a male and zero otherwise,  is a vector of each 
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worker´s individual characteristics as well as industry, establishment, and job characteristics, 
whereas , , , , , and  are the vectors of parameters. Finally,  and  
include unobservable characteristics associated with each type of worker1. We assume that 
,  and  follow a trivariate normal distribution with a vector of means 
equal to zero and with the following covariance matrix: 
 
We can now derive the expectation of each worker´s log wage conditional on observable 
characteristics and on her supervisory status: 
 (6) 
 (7) 
where , ,  is the density function of a 
standard normal and  is its distribution function. Thus, we can estimate all the 
parameters using a two-step methodology. First, we estimate a probit model for the 
supervisory job decision with the whole sample. Second, we substitute the predicted 
probabilities,  and  into equations (6) and (7) 
in order to estimate separate wage regressions for each group of workers. In this way, we 
control for the sample selection problem of workers with and without supervisory jobs. 
This econometric specification estimates the contribution to the wage gap of the difference 
between men and women in each observable characteristic. Furthermore, we can separate 
these contributions for supervisors and non-supervisors. For example, from equation (6), 
the gender wage difference for supervisors is defined as: 
                                                             
1 The meanings of the subscripts in the different stages of each worker´s decision process are slightly 
different. In particular, the subscript of each variable in the job status choice (equations 1-3) denotes whether 
the corresponding variable include only individual characteristics (subscript i) or industrial, establishment, job 
and individual characteristics (subscript hjki). However, the subscript of each variable in the wage equations, 
that is, in equations (4) and (5), identifies the worker considered. For this reason, all the variables in those 
equations have the same subscript which represents the worker i holding job k within the establishment j in 
the industry h. 
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             (8) 
The wage difference for non-supervisors is defined in a similar way from equation (7): 
            (9) 
As  includes the proportion of women with supervisory jobs within each establishment as 
well as its interaction with gender and segregation variables, from equations (8) and (9), we 
can separate the effect of an increase in the proportion of women with supervisory jobs 
within each establishment on the wage gap within each job from the effect of this better 
representation of women among supervisors on the wage gap caused by each type of 
gender segregation. Standard errors for these contributions are clustered at the 
establishment level. 
2.2. Description of the variables 
This section describes the variables used in the wage regressions. The dependent variable 
for the probit model takes value 1 if the worker holds a supervisory job and 0 otherwise, 
whereas the log gross hourly wage is the dependent variable of the wage regressions. The 
control variables include individual characteristics as well as characteristics of the industry, 
the establishment, and each worker's job. Individual characteristics include gender and 
nationality, different measures of a worker’s human capital, such as the number of years of 
schooling, theoretical work experience,2 and tenure in the firm. We add the square of 
theoretical work experience to take into account the possible concave relationship between 
wages and this variable. Additionally, three dummy variables are used  to represent the type 
of contract: the first dummy takes value 1 when the work is temporary and 0 otherwise; the 
                                                             
2 Theoretical work experience is equal to the age of each worker minus his/her years of completed schooling 
minus 6. 
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second dummy variable takes value 1 when the  worker’s contract is part-time and 0 
otherwise; and the third  dummy variable takes value 1 when the contract is seasonal and 0 
otherwise  
 
We included the proportion of women in each industry to identify the industrial 
segregation effect on the wage gap. This variable was calculated using the Spanish National 
Classification of Economic Activities 2009 (NCEA-09) conducted out by the Spanish 
National Institute of Statistics.  
The establishment characteristics were controlled by variables which indicate its size, 
ownership, target market, type of collective bargaining agreement applied, as well as 
establishment segregation. In particular, we used dummy variables to classify 
establishments as large (100 or more workers), medium (between 50 and 99 workers), and 
small (fewer than 50 workers). Regarding the type of ownership, a dummy variable was 
used to distinguish state-owned establishments from private establishments. Likewise, 
establishments whose target market was regional, national or international were 
differentiated. Furthermore, other dummy variables were added to consider the type of 
collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, we distinguished sectorial or regional 
agreements – which are automatically extended to cover an industry or a region –from 
firm-specific agreements, which are applied to all establishments in the same firm. Finally, 
we added the proportion of women in each establishment and the proportion of women 
among supervisors within each establishment, which is the key variable in this study. 
Regarding job characteristics, we included the proportion of women working in each job 
within each establishment.  
In order to estimate what we called the direct and indirect effects of women´s access to 
supervisory jobs on gender outcomes in the labour market, the proportion of women 
among supervisors interacts with four gender variables: the dummy variable indicating 
whether a worker is female and the proportions of women within each industry, 
establishment, and job. The estimated coefficient of the first interaction variable measures 
the direct effect of an increase in women´s responsibilities on the wage gap, whereas the 
estimated coefficients of the other interaction variables depict the indirect effects on the 
wage difference between both genders. For example, if a rise in the proportion of female 
supervisors decreased the gender wage gap and decreased the effect of each type of gender 
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segregation on the wage difference, the estimated coefficients of these four variables would 
be positive. 
To identify the parameters of our model, an explanatory variable had to be included that 
only affects the probit decision but not each worker´s wage. In our analysis, we assumed 
that short-term disabilities, recently born children, having to care for other family members 
or dependants, or being on strike would affect the type of job chosen by workers, but 
would not have an influence on workers´ wages. For this reason, we added four 
explanatory dummy variables in the probit model that are not included in the wage 
regressions. In particular, the first dummy variable represents whether each worker was on 
sick leave due to a temporary disability during the year; the second dummy variable takes 
value 1 if each worker was on maternity or paternity leave during the year and 0 otherwise; 
the third dummy variable indicates whether each worker had fewer working days in order 
to looking after other family members; and the fourth dummy variable takes value 1 if the 
worker was on strike or suspended from her job for any reason during the year and 0 
otherwise. Thus, the basic assumption was that people make decisions and face restrictions 
during their life cycle that have an effect on their health status, the size of their family, and 
their family commitment, and that these decisions and restrictions would also affect their 
probabilities of being offered and accepting a supervisory job. However, each worker´s 
wage only depends on the type of job chosen, her level of integration in the Spanish labour 
market (measured by each employee´s nationality), her human capital, her type of contract, 
and the type of industry and firm in which she works. In other words, we assumed that, 
conditional on the four dummy variables added to the probit model, the random shocks of 
the wage regressions are independent of the explanatory variables. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 The dataset 
The data used in this study were obtained from the 2010 Wage Structure Survey (WSS-
2010) conducted by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics. This survey contains 
matched employer-employee data drawn from a representative sample of 213,709 salaried 
workers belonging to 24,848 establishments located in Spain in 2010 and provides 
information on wages, employees´ socioeconomic variables, and establishment and job 
characteristics.  
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The WSS-2010 contains information on establishments with 1 or more workers. One of 
the main advantages of this database is that it covers a wide spectrum of industries and 
occupations; specifically, it includes establishments from 18 different industries which 
appear in the 2009 Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities (NCEA-09). 
Moreover, it provides a high degree of occupational disaggregation due to containing 
information on 60 different occupations. 
We consider that individuals holding the same occupation within the same establishment 
and with the same supervisory status occupy the same job. Given this narrow definition, 
we expects that most jobs include only a few employees. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
jobs by the number of women and men in each job. 
Table 1. Distribution of jobs across different size categories 
Number of 
women in each 
job 
Number of men in each job 
0 1 2 3-4 5-9 
10-
50 Total 
0 
0 31,489 7300 4715 1850 350 
45,70
4 
1 
21,685 4276 1546 1021 551 190 
29,26
9 
2 3718 1518 724 512 289 121 6882 
3-4 1871 988 560 490 360 139 4408 
5-9 705 632 428 507 427 133 2832 
10-50 190 195 176 249 289 37 1136 
Total 
28,169 39,098 10,734 7494 3766 970 
90,23
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Table 1 shows that there were 53,174 jobs with only one worker (58.9% of the total). There 
were 16,358 integrated jobs, i.e., jobs including men and women. The remaining jobs were 
held by either men or women. More specifically, there were 45,704 jobs occupied by men 
alone and 28,169 by women alone. On average, there were 3.16 men per job in the former 
category and  3 women in the latter. 
3.2. Sample statistics 
Table 2 compares establishments in which there are women supervisors to those in which 
there are no female supervisors. The average hourly wage is significantly higher in the 
former establishments than in the latter. Likewise, women achieve supervisory positions in 
establishments with more female workers and with more educated workers. Furthermore, 
workers have greater tenure in the firm, but lower labour experience in establishments with 
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female supervisors than in the other type. There are also fewer temporary and more 
discontinuous indefinite contracts in this type of workplace. On average, establishments 
with some female supervisors are larger, a greater percentage are state-owned, their target 
market is wider, and they have more firm-specific agreements than the other type of 
establishments. Finally, there are more workers in commerce and vehicle repair, hospitality, 
information and communication, finance and insurance, professional, scientific and 
technical activities, public administration, defence and health services in establishments 
with some female supervisors than in establishments without female supervisors. However, 
the opposite is the case in extractive industries, manufacturing, energy, gas, steam, and air 
conditioning providers, provision of water and waste management, construction, transport, 
real estate agents, administrative and auxiliary activities, education, and artistic and 
entertainment activities. 
Table 2. Sample statistics by type of establishment 
Variable Establishments with 
female supervisors 
Establishments without 
female supervisors 
Total 
Individual characteristics    
Hourly wage, Euros*** 17.5163 (14.9726) 15.0046 (13.3093) 16.1288 (14.1333) 
Proportion of women*** 0.5260 (0.4993) 0.3514 (0.4774) 0.4295 (0.4950) 
Schooling years*** 11.9860 (3.9850) 10.7320 (4.0231) 11.2932 (4.0543) 
Firm tenure (years)*** 9.8898 (9.8439) 8.7106 (9.3785) 9.2384(9.6074) 
Work experience (years)*** 22.3995 (11.6215) 23.6753 (11.8054) 23.1043 (11.7406) 
Partial contracts 0.1672 (0.3731) 0.1673 (0.3733) 0.1673 (0.3732) 
Temporary contracts*** 0.1854 (0.3886) 0.2620 (0.4397) 0.2277 (0.4194) 
Discontinuous indefinite contracts*** 0.0211 (0.1437) 0.0160 (0.1253) 0.0183 (0.1339) 
Establishment characteristics    
Medium establishment*** 0.0933 (0.2909) 0.1214 (0.3266) 0.1088 (0.3114) 
Large establishment*** 0.7308 (0.4435) 0.4680 (0.4990) 0.5857 (0.4926) 
Public ownership*** 0.1906 (0.3928) 0.1392 (0.3462) 0.1622 (0.3687) 
National market*** 0.4464 (0.4971) 0.4171 (0.4931) 0.4302 (0.4951) 
Foreign market*** 0.1780 (0.3825) 0.1380 (0.3449) 0.1559 (0.3628) 
Firm agreement*** 0.3732 (0.4836) 0.3221 (0.4673) 0.3449 (0.4754) 
Industry    
Extractive industry*** 0.0034 (0.0580) 0.0113 (0.1055) 0.0077 (0.0876) 
Manufacturing industry*** 0.1883 (0.3909) 0.2773 (0.4476) 0.2374 (0.4255) 
Energy, gas, steam and air conditioning providers*** 0.0061 (0.0779) 0.0110 (0.1045) 0.0088 (0.0936) 
Provision of water and waste management*** 0.0215 (0.1452) 0.0324 (0.1771) 0.0275 (0.1637) 
Construction*** 0.0390 (0.1935) 0.0871 (0.2819) 0.0655 (0.2475) 
Commerce and vehicle repair*** 0.1020 (0.3026) 0.0678 (0.2514) 0.0831 (0.2760) 
Transport*** 0.0435 (0.2039) 0.0609 (0.2392) 0.0531 (0.2243) 
Hospitality*** 0.0459 (0.2093) 0.0228 (0.1492) 0.0331 (0.1790) 
Information and communication industry*** 0.0604 (0.2382) 0.0496 (0.2172) 0.0544 (0.2269) 
Finance and insurance*** 0.0703 (0.2557) 0.0243 (0.1539) 0.0449 (0.2070) 
Real estate agents*** 0.0048 (0.0693) 0.0072 (0.0845) 0.0061 (0.0781) 
Professional, scientific and technical activities*** 0.0858 (0.2801) 0.0618 (0.2408) 0.0726 (0.2594) 
Administrative and auxiliary activities*** 0.0755 (0.2642) 0.1056 (0.3073) 0.0921 (0.2892) 
Public Administrations and defence*** 0.0673 (0.2505) 0.0298 (0.1701) 0.0466 (0.2107) 
Education*** 0.0274 (0.1633) 0.0324 (0.1769) 0.0301 (0.1710) 
Health services*** 0.1062 (0.3081) 0.0664 (0.2489) 0.0842 (0.2777) 
Artistic and entertainment activities* 0.0254 (0.1575) 0.0268 (0.1614) 0.0262 (0.1597) 
    
Sample size 95 651 118 058 213 709 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. A mean comparison test assuming independent samples and unequal variances was 
conducted. *indicates a 10% significance level; **indicates a 5% significance level; and *** indicates a 1% significance level. 
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Table 3 depicts significant gender differences related to market outcomes. We observe that 
men earn on average 29.1% more than women per hour worked. Men have more tenure in 
the firm and more theoretical work experience, whereas women have a higher educational 
level. Women hold more temporary, partial, and discontinuous indefinite contracts than 
men. Thus, women are contracted with a lower level of commitment to firms than men. 
More men work in smaller establishments than women, but are employed in firms with a 
wider target market. In addition, more women work in publicly owned establishments. 
 
Table 3. Sample statistics by gender 
Variable Men Women Total 
Individual characteristics    
Hourly wage, Euros*** 17.8600 (15.2524) 13.8298 (12.1166) 16.1288 (14.1333) 
Schooling years*** 10.9653 (4.0779) 11.7288 (3.9812) 11.2932 (4.0543) 
Firm tenure (years)*** 10.0909 (10.1592) 8.1062 (8.6933) 9.2384 (9.6074) 
Work experience (years)*** 24.2011 (11.7410) 21.6476 (11.5807) 23.1043 (11.7406) 
Partial contracts*** 0.0918 (0.2888) 0.2674 (0.4426) 0.1673 (0.3732) 
Temporary contracts*** 0.2182 (0.4130) 0.2404 (0.4273) 0.2277 (0.4194) 
Discontinuous indefinite contracts*** 0.0091 (0.0949) 0.0305 (0.1719) 0.0183 (0.1339) 
Establishment characteristics    
Medium establishment*** 0.1189 (0.3237) 0.0954 (0.2938) 0.1088 (0.3114) 
Large establishment*** 0.5544 (0.4970) 0.6272 (0.4836) 0.5857 (0.4926) 
Public ownership*** 0.1312 (0.3376) 0.2034 (0.4025) 0.1622 (0.3687) 
National market*** 0.4351 (0.4958) 0.4236 (0.4941) 0.4302 (0.4951) 
Foreign market*** 0.1815 (0.3854) 0.1219 (0.3272) 0.1559 (0.3628) 
Firm agreement 0.3458 (0.4756) 0.3438 (0.4750) 0.3449 (0.4754) 
Gender segregation    
Proportion of women in each industry*** 0.3729 (0.1709) 0.5048 (0.1628) 0.4295 (0.1797) 
Proportion of women in each establishment*** 0.2772 (0.2322) 0.6319 (0.2428) 0.4295 (0.2948) 
Proportion of women in each job*** 0.1969 (0.3215) 0.5447 (0.3175) 0.3463 (0.3632) 
Proportion of women with supervisory jobs*** 0.1769 (0.2818) 0.3556 (0.3858) 0.2537 (0.3421) 
    
Sample size 121 911 91 798 213 709 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. A mean comparison test assuming independent samples and unequal variances 
was conducted.* indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5% significance level; and *** indicates a 1% significance level. 
 
A comparison of the proportion of women in industries, establishments or jobs in which 
both men and women work clearly shows that there is gender segregation in the Spanish 
labour market. For example, we see that only 37.29% of women work in those industries 
where men are employed, whereas 50.48% of women work in those industries where 
women work. Thus, industrial segregation by gender is an important phenomenon. Table 3 
also highlights the importance of establishment segregation and occupational segregation 
within each establishment. Finally, the proportion of women with supervisory tasks in 
those establishments in which men work is significantly lower than in those in which 
women work. Hence, famale supervisors typically oversee other women. 
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4. Results 
This section includes several sets of estimations. First, Table 4 presents the marginal effects 
of each variable on the probability of having a supervisory job. Second, the OLS results 
obtained from standard regressions without controlling for the endogeneity of the job 
choice are included in the first two columns of Table 5, whereas the last four columns 
show the results of the switching model for workers with and without supervisory jobs, 
separately. Finally, based on the estimations of the switching model, Table 6 shows the 
effects on the wage gap of gender differences by observable characteristics3. 
4.1. Probit estimates 
As expected, Table 4 shows that the probability of holding a supervisory job is significantly 
lower for women than for men and is higher for Spanish employees than for foreigners. 
We also observe that individuals from countries that do not belong to the European Union 
have a significantly lower probability of reaching a supervisory post than workers from 
Latin America and from the European Union. Hence, it seems that job status is associated 
with the level of assimilation of foreign workers into the Spanish labour market. 
Furthermore, the higher the worker´s educational level, labour experience, and firm tenure, 
the greater the probability of holding a supervisory job. As usual, the effect of labour 
experience is not linear. Finally, workers with short-term disabilities, those on strike, or 
those caring for other family members are less likely to hold a supervisory job. However, 
Spanish laws against gender discrimination and the authorities´ surveillance of this type of 
practice may prevent being on maternity leave from having a significant effect on the 
probability of reaching a supervisory status. 
The type of contract also affects the probability of holding a supervisory job. In particular, 
workers with part-time or temporary contracts are less likely to oversee other workers than 
those with indefinite contracts, even when the indefinite contracts are seasonal. Thus, the 
greater workers´ commitment to a firm, the greater the probability of holding a supervisory 
post. Regarding the effect of occupational segregation within each establishment, we found 
that the higher the proportion of female employees within a job, the lower the probability 
                                                             
3 If the mean difference between men and women for a variable or its estimated coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero (at least at a 10% level), we assign zero to its relative impact.    
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of reaching a supervisory status within that job. This may be because women are more 
concentrated in jobs in which they have less chance of reaching a supervisory position. 
Regarding the effects of the characteristics of establishments, we found that workers are 
less likely to hold a supervisory job in larger establishments than in smaller ones, in public 
establishments than in private ones, and in establishments whose target market is national 
rather than regional. Workers are less likely to oversee other workers in establishments with 
firm-specific agreements than in those governed by sectorial or national agreements. These 
results suggest that the likelihood that workers oversee other employees depend on the 
ratio of supervisory jobs to potential candidates within each establishment, which will 
depend on its size, ownership, target market and type of collective agreement. Regarding 
the effect of establishment segregation by gender, we found that the higher the proportion 
of women within an establishment, the higher the chances of having a supervisory job. 
Thus, it appears that there is a higher concentration of women in  establishments with 
more supervisory jobs. This may also explain that an increase in the proportion of women 
with supervisory positions within an establishment significantly increases the probability of 
achieving this type of job. 
In contrast, women are concentrated in industries with fewer possibilities of achieving a 
supervisory position. The estimated coefficients of the interactions between the proportion 
of women among supervisors within each establishment and other gender variables 
illustrate the effects of increasing women´s power within the workplace. In fact, we 
obtained that a greater proportion of female supervisors decreases the gender difference in 
the probability of reaching a supervisory job. Moreover, an increase in the proportion of 
women in supervisory posts increases the probability of a worker reaching these positions 
and this effect is greater in those jobs where more women work, but is lower in those 
establishments where there are a greater concentration of women4. In summary, an increase 
in the proportion of female supervisors within an establishment will narrow the gender gap 
in the access to these posts by means of two mechanisms. First, a better access for women 
to supervisory positions will increase the probability of reaching these posts to a greater 
extent for women than for men. Second, when more women oversee other workers within 
                                                             
4As Table 4 shows, an increase in the proportion of women within each establishment as well as an increase 
in the proportion of women among supervisors within an establishment increases the probability of workers 
holding a supervisory job. These estimations could reflect the existence of female-friendly establishments. 
However, in female-dominated establishments with more women among supervisors, there will be fewer 
supervisory posts left for other workers, which could explain the negative impact of the interaction between 
female supervisors and the proportion of women within each establishment. 
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an establishment, they will help other women to reach supervisory positions mainly in 
female-dominated jobs. 
 
Table 4. Probit model for the supervisory job choice 
 Marginal effect Stand. E.(1) 
Individual regressors   
Female -0.1007*** 0.0036 
EU (Spain not included) -0.0097** 0.0049 
Rest of Europe -0.0654*** 0.0107 
Latin America -0.0311*** 0.0056 
Rest of the world -0.0331*** 0.0078 
Schooling years 0.0239*** 0.0004 
 
0.0144*** 0.0008 
Experience 0.0059*** 0.0003 
Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0001 
Short-term disability -0.0366*** 0.0018 
Maternity leave -0.0052 0.0039 
Family care -0.0278*** 0.0054 
Being on strike -0.0575*** 0.0030 
Temporary contracts -0.0455*** 0.0030 
Part-time contracts -0.0423*** 0.0033 
Discontinuous indefinite contracts 0.0631*** 0.0166 
   
Job regressors   
Proportion of women -0.2992*** 0.0085 
   
Establishment regressors   
Proportion of women 0.0501*** 0.0080 
Proportion of women with supervisory jobs 0.0733*** 0.0117 
Medium establishment -0.0128*** 0.0033 
Large establishment -0.0323*** 0.0029 
Public ownership -0.0259*** 0.0044 
National market -0.0067** 0.0029 
Foreign market -0.0038 0.0039 
Firm agreement -0.0153*** 0.0031 
   
Industrial regressors   
Proportion of women -0.0661*** 0.0108 
   
Interactions of the proportion of women with supervisory jobs within each 
establishment with the following explanatory variables 
Female dummy 0.2807*** 0.0071 
Proportion of women in each industry -0.0287 0.0262 
Proportion of women in each establishment -0.1992*** 0.0156 
Proportion of women in each job 0.2175*** 0.0180 
Number of observations 213,709  
Χ2(30 degrees of freedom) 11,829.82  
Predicted probability 0.1078  
Pseudo R-squared 0.2311  
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. There are 24,848 
clusters. ***Level of significance 1%. **Level of significance 5%. *Level of significance 
10%. 
  
4.2. Wage regressions 
The first two columns of Table 5 include the results of the wage regressions without 
controlling for the endogeneity of supervisory jobs, whereas the remaining columns 
contain the estimations of the switching model for supervisors and for non-supervisors. 
Similarly, Table 6 shows the effect on the wage gap of the difference between men and 
women in each observable characteristic. Taking into account the main goal of this paper, 
Table 5 highlights the estimated coefficients of the proportion of women with supervisory 
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jobs interacted with the gender dummy variable and with the proportion of women within 
each industry, establishment and job5.The standard errors are clustered at the establishment 
level. 
The results of this switching model allow us to estimate the effects on the wage gap of 
gender difference by observable characteristics for supervisors and for non-supervisors. 
Specifically, the wage difference between non-supervisor men and non-supervisor women 
with the same observable characteristics and the same job is 9.7%. This unexplained 
difference between genders accounts for 55.4% of the wage inequality. However, the 
unexplained wage gap is not significantly different from zero for supervisors. 
As in other previous studies, the uncorrected regressions show that an increase in the 
proportion of women among supervisors significantly decreases the unexplained wage 
difference between men and women. Similarly, a higher proportion of female supervisors 
within an establishment significantly increases wages in female-dominated industries, but 
decreases wages in establishments and jobs in which there is a greater concentration of 
women. Nevertheless, the results of the switching model suggest that a greater proportion 
of female supervisors within each organization significantly increases the wage gap for both 
supervisors and non-supervisors. Table 6 shows that an increase in the proportion of 
female supervisors within an establishment explains 82.8% of the wage gap among 
supervisors and 12.6% of the wage gap among non-supervisors. Thus, these estimations 
are strongly biased when the endogeneity of job choice is not taken into account. 
We found some differences between supervisors and non-supervisors in relation to the 
impact of women´s access to supervisory posts on the contribution of gender segregation 
to the wage gap. First, the higher the proportion of women within an industry, the lower 
the wage, but this effect is lower when there are more women among supervisors, which 
contributes to decreasing the gender wage difference by 18.6% among supervisors and 9% 
among non-supervisors. Second, a greater proportion of women within an establishment 
significantly increases supervisors´ wages, but this effect is lower in those establishments 
with more female supervisors, explaining 29.9% of the supervisors´ wage gap. However, a 
greater concentration of women within an establishment significantly decreases non-
supervisors´ wages and this effect is greater when there are more women among 
                                                             
5We refer to the estimated coefficients of these variables alone, but the remaining estimated coefficients are 
consistent with those of previous studies. For example, Amuedo Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) obtained 
similar effects for the remaining explanatory variables on wages in the Spanish labour market, although they 
did not study the impact of women´s access to supervisory jobs. 
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supervisors, which widens the non-supervisors´ wage gap by 7.5%. Third, a rise in the 
proportion of women within a job significantly increases supervisors´ wages, but this effect 
is lower in those establishments where more women hold a supervisory position, which 
accounts for 32.5% of supervisors´ wage gap. Nevertheless, an increase in women´s power 
within each establishment does not affect the impact of occupational segregation within 
each establishment on the wage gap for non supervisors. Overall, a higher proportion of 
women among supervisors increases their gender wage gap by 126.6% and explains 11% of 
the non-supervisors´ wage difference. 
According to previous results, it seems that when more women reach supervisory jobs 
within female-dominated industries, the main players in the wage bargaining process within 
those industries are more aware of gender issues, the result of which is a decrease in the 
average wage difference. Regarding the effects of establishment segregation and 
occupational segregation within each establishment, we observe that women are more 
concentrated in those establishments and jobs where supervisors´ wages are greater, but 
these wage premiums are lower when there are more women among supervisors. Thus, the 
results might suggest that supervisory positions occupied by women usually imply a 
nominal change in the job title instead of being better paid jobs with additional 
responsibilities. Then, a lack of power could explain that a greater proportion of women 
with supervisory jobs does not help to reduce the wage gap among workers beneath them 
in those establishments and jobs where more women work. 
The switching model also estimates the covariance between unobservable variables that 
affect the choice of supervisory jobs and unobservable variables that influence the wage 
setting. The estimations of  and  from equations (6) and (7) suggest that 
unobservable characteristics which positively affect the probability of reaching a 
supervisory job are negatively correlated with unobservable variables which positively 
influence wages for all workers. These results are consistent with Jacobs´ (1992) notion of 
“title inflation”, that is, the reclassification of previously non-supervisory jobs as 
supervisory jobs with little change in authority or wages. In fact, our results show that 
those workers with the worst paid unobservable characteristics are more likely to hold a 
supervisory job6. 
                                                             
6 It is possible that women can only help to narrow the gender wage gap when they have enough power 
within organizations. For this reason, wage regressions were repeated using a dummy variable indicating 
whether there are at least 25% (and 50%) of women among supervisors within each establishment instead of 
using the proportion of female supervisors. The results obtained are qualitatively similar and are available 
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Table 5. Wage regression results 
Standard regressions Switching model  
 All the workers Supervisors Non supervisors 
 Coefficient Stand. E.(1) Coefficient Stand. E.(1) Coefficient Stand. E.(1) 
Intercept 1.4326*** 
*** 
0.0115 1.9767*** 0.0770 1.6087*** 0.0040 
Individual regressors       
  Female -0.1590*** 0.0033 -0.0272 0.0210 -0.0977*** 0.0040 
  EU (Spain not included) 0.0662*** 0.0082 0.1278*** 0.0228 0.0551*** 0.0081 
  Rest of Europe -0.0250 0.0178 0.0384 0.0964 0.0006 0.0170 
  Latin America -0.0338*** 0.0072 0.0203 0.0311 -0.0275*** 0.0070 
  Rest of the world 0.0225* 0.0128 0.1584*** 0.0448 0.0176 0.0127 
  Schooling years 0.0640*** 0.0006 0.0510*** 0.0029 0.0455*** 0.0009 
    0.0849*** 0.0015 0.0395*** 0.0031 0.0841*** 0.0016 
  Experience 0.0168*** 0.0004 0.0213*** 0.0012 0.0095*** 0.0005 
  Experience2 -0.0002*** 7.82E-06 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0001*** 8.38E-06 
  Temporary contracts -0.0246*** 0.0043 -0.0238** 0.0121 0.0058 0.0044 
  Part-time contracts -0.0224*** 0.0049 -0.0064 0.0147 -0.0064 0.0051 
  Discontinuous indefinite contracts 0.1966*** 0.0199 -0.0004 0.0437 0.2020*** 0.0207 
       
Job regressors       
  Proportion of women -0.1015*** 
*** 
0.0070 
 
0.3405*** 0.0477 0.0032 0.0085 
       
Establishment regressors       
  Proportion of women -0.1024*** 
** 
0.0111 
 
0.0526** 0.0261 -0.1811*** 0.0114 
  Proportion of women with supervisory jobs 0.0445** 
* 
0.0192 
 
0.0098 0.0352 -0.0271 0.0202 
  Medium establishment 0.0775*** 0.0062 0.1320*** 0.0118 0.0750*** 0.0063 
  Large establishment 0.1514*** 0.0049 0.2376*** 0.0099 0.1609*** 0.0051 
  Public ownership 0.1185*** 0.0080 0.0397*** 0.0136 0.1729*** 0.0086 
  National market 0.0543*** 0.0049 0.1212*** 0.0084 0.0380*** 
 
0.0051 
  Foreign market 0.0991*** 0.0072 0.1493*** 0.0115 0.0871*** 0.0075 
  Firm agreement 0.0629*** 0.0057 0.0780*** 0.0099 0.0716*** 0.0059 
       
Industrial regressors       
  Proportion of women -0.1368*** 
*** 
0.0183 
 
-0.0955*** 0.0359 -0.0956*** 0.0190 
       
Interactions of the proportion of women with supervisory jobs within each establishment with the following explanatory variables  
  Female dummy 0.0682*** 0.0068 -0.3174*** 0.0468 -0.0732*** 0.0103 
  Proportion of women in each industry 0.1443*** 0.0435 0.1863** 0.0735 0.1815*** 0.0467 
  Proportion of women in each establishment -0.2296*** 0.0280 -0.2139*** 0.0474 -0.0937*** 0.0323 
  Proportion of women in each job -0.0331** 0.0172 -0.3788*** 0.0595 -0.0274 0.0212 
       
Other parameters       
 
  -0.2945*** 0.0289   
 
    -0.1539*** 0.0154 
Number of observations 213 709  40 276  173 433  
F(26,  24 847) 1534.80      
F(27,  15 138)   537.37    
F(27,  23 695)     986.22  
R-squared 0.4599  0.4312  0.4311  
Notes: (1) The standard errors are adjusted for 24,848 clusters for the OLS estimations, those of supervisors´ regressions are adjusted for 
15,139 clusters and those of non-supervisors are adjusted for 23,696 clusters. ***Level of significance 1%. **Level of significance 5%. 
*Level of significance 10%. 
 
It may be the case that women with power within firms can only help other women to 
increase their wages when wages are set within these organizations, but cannot do this if 
wages are bargained in a wider context, such as industry in general, the region or the entire 
country. For this reason, uncorrected and corrected regressions were also estimated for the 
different types of collective bargaining agreement applied. The results are not described, 
but we find that the results for  workers covered by firm-specific agreements and for those 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
from the authors upon request. The only difference we highlight is that the probability of holding a 
supervisory job is lower in establishments where there are at least 50% of female supervisors than in the other 
establishments. This change is predictable because when the proportion of female supervisors is higher than 
50% in an establishment, it is less likely that other workers can achieve these positions. 
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covered by national, regional, or industry agreements are similar to those presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, no significant differences were found between the results 
obtained for workers covered by each type of collective agreement. 
 
Table 6. Gender wage gap decompositions 
 Mean difference by gender Contribution to the wage gap 
 Supervisors Non supervisors Supervisors Non supervisors 
Individual regressors     
  Female -1.0000*** -1.0000*** 0.0000 0.0977 
  EU (Spain not included) 0.0000 0.0039*** 0.0000 0.0002 
  Rest of Europe 0.0000 -0.0004* 0.0000 0.0000 
  Latin America -0.0025** -0.0040*** 0.0000 0.0001 
  Rest of the world 0.0021*** 0.0127*** 0.0003 0.0000 
  Schooling years -0.8955*** -0.9593*** -0.0457 -0.0436 
    0.3815*** 0.2283*** 0.0151 0.0192 
  Experience 4.7883*** 2.0983*** 0.1023 0.0199 
  Experience2 229.9770*** 100.4354*** -0.0449 -0.0103 
  Temporary contracts -0.0170*** -0.0110*** 0.0004 0.0000 
  Part-time contracts -0.0740*** -0.1895*** 0.0000 0.0000 
  Discontinuous indefinite contracts -0.0101*** -0.0232*** 0.0000 -0.0047 
   0.0276 
 
0.0785 
 
Job regressors     
  Proportion of women -0.2908*** 
*** 
 
-0.3446*** 
*** 
 
-0.0990 
 
0.0000 
 
   -0.0990 
 
0.0000 
 
Establishment regressors     
  Proportion of women -0.2985*** 
*** 
 
-0.3665*** 
*** 
 
-0.0156 
* 
0.0664 
 
  Proportion of women with supervisory jobs -0.4774*** 
*** 
 
-0.1264*** 
*** 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
  Medium establishment 0.0219*** 0.0235*** 0.0029 0.0018 
  Large establishment -0.0280*** -0.0794*** -0.0067 -0.0128 
  Public ownership -0.0713*** -0.0720*** -0.0028 -0.0124 
  National market 0.0287*** 0.0068*** 0.0035 0.0003 
  Foreign market 0.0632*** 0.0568*** 0.0094 0.0049 
  Firm agreement 0.0093* 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 
   -0.0087 
 
0.0481 
 
Industrial regressors     
  Proportion of women -0.1114*** 
*** 
 
-0.1354*** 
*** 
 
0.0106 
 
0.0129 
 
   0.0106 
 
0.0129 
 
Interactions of the proportion of women with supervisory jobs within each establishment with other explanatory variables  
  Female dummy -0.6552*** -0.3031*** 0.2080 0.0222 
  Proportion of women in each industry -0.2511*** -0.0881*** -0.0468 -0.0160 
  Proportion of women in each establishment -0.3514*** -0.1421*** 0.0752 0.0133 
  Proportion of women in each job -0.2153*** -0.1095*** 0.0816 0.0000 
   0.3179 
 
0.0195 
 
Other variables     
 
-0.0089*** 
*** 
 0.0026 
 
 
 
 0.1119*** 
*** 
 
 0.0172 
 
Overall sum   0.2511 
 
0.1763 
 
Notes: The raw wage gap, as measured by the sex difference in mean log wages, is 0.2511 for supervisors and 0.1763 for non-
supervisors. The first two columns show the mean differences by gender of all regressors for supervisors and non-supervisors, 
respectively. In both columns, mean comparison tests are applied assuming independent samples and unequal variances. ***Level of 
significance 1%; **Level of significance 5%; *Level of significance 10%. The last two columns show the absolute contribution to the 
wage gap of the gender difference in each regressor. The contributions were obtained by multiplying the coefficients in Table 5 by the 
sex differences in the sample means in this table. The cumulative effects of individual, industrial, establishment, and job regressors, as 
well as those of the interactions of the proportion of women among supervisors with other female variables, are shown below the 
horizontal lines. 
 
Some previous studies have only investigated employees in the private sector. Given that 
the results shown in Table 5 may be driven by the presence of workers employed in state-
owned establishments, wage regressions were repeated only for workers within private 
establishments. Once again, the qualitative results (not reported) are the same as those for 
the whole sample. 
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Finally, in order to address the possibility that female supervisors may only influence some 
components of wages, all the wage models were also estimated separately for the base 
salary and for the variable complements. These estimations were not included in the paper 
because no qualitative differences were found between these estimations and those 
presented in Tables 5 and 67. 
5. Robustness of the results 
This section includes additional estimations to test the robustness of our results because 
the empirical evidence presented could be sensitive to data restrictions8. Table 7 shows the 
effects of women having better access to supervisory jobs on the wage gap obtained under 
different selection criteria. Specifically, estimations were conducted for jobs with more than 
two workers, for integrated jobs with more than two workers, and for integrated jobs with 
more than two workers and at least 1 worker with supervisory tasks within each 
establishment. 
5.1 The effects of size thresholds for jobs 
As shown in Section 3, the database used contains many jobs with only one or two 
workers. Since this feature could have driven the results, we replicated the estimations of 
the switching model and excluded all workers in jobs with fewer than three employees in 
order to investigate this possibility. These results are included in the first column of Table 7 
for supervisors and in the second column for non-supervisors. Specifically, the first row of 
Table 7 shows the direct effect of a greater proportion of female supervisors on the wage 
difference, whereas the second, third, and fourth rows show the indirect impacts of 
women´s power within an establishment on gender wage inequality via its effect on the 
different types of gender segregation. Finally, the last row of Table 7 shows the total effect 
of an increase in women´s access to supervisory positions on the wage gap. 
 
Table 7. Contribution of women´s access to supervisory jobs to the wage gap (robustness of the results) 
Component Supervisors 
(1) 
Non 
supervisors (2) 
Supervisors (3) Non 
supervisors (4) 
Supervisors 
(5) 
Non 
Supervisors (6) 
Direct effect 0,2863 
 
0,0244 
 
0,1922 
 
0,0480 0,1922 0,0797 
Industrial segregation -0,1889 -0,0246 -0,1955 -0,0134 -0,1955 -0,0282 
                                                             
7This paper assumes that establishments without supervisory jobs have a horizontal hierarchy, in which case 
the proportion of female supervisors would be trivially equal to zero. However, when the sample is restricted 
to establishments with at least 1 supervisory job, the qualitative results are exactly the same. 
8 These results are available from the authors on request. 
23 
 
Establishment segregation 0,1867 0,0212 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Job segregation 0,0784 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0055 0,0000 0,0000 
Total effect 0,3625 
 
0,0209 
 
-0,0032 
 
0,0291 
 
-0,0032 
 
0,0515 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) shows, for supervisors, the results for jobs with more than two workers, for integrated jobs with more than two 
workers, and for integrated jobs with more than two workers and at least 1 worker with supervisory tasks, respectively. Columns (2), (4) 
and (6) show the same for non-supervisors. If the mean difference between men and women for a variable or its estimated coefficient is 
not significantly different from zero (at least at a 10% level), we assign zero to its relative impact. 
 
 
Table 7 shows that an increase in women´s power within each establishment increases 
relative female wages in industries dominated by female workers and decreases the gender 
wage difference by 73.2% among supervisors and by 13.1% among non-supervisors. In 
contrast, an increase in access to supervisory jobs among women decreases the relative 
female wages in those establishments where more women work and increases their gender 
wage gap by 72.4% among supervisors and by 11.3% among non-supervisors. In addition, 
a greater proportion of female supervisors significantly widens the wage gap due to 
occupational segregation within each establishment, but only among supervisors, which 
explains 30.4% of supervisors´ wage difference by gender. Unlike the negative 
repercussions reported in other empirical studies, we found that an increase in the number 
of women achieving supervisory positions within an establishment increases women´s 
earnings less than men´s earnings and increases the gender wage difference by 111% 
among supervisors and by 13% among non-supervisors. 
In summary, an increase in female supervisors in each establishment increases the wage 
difference between men and women by 140.6% for supervisors and by 11.1% for non-
supervisors. Hence, these results are consistent with those presented in Section 4. 
5.2 The effect of representation of both genders in each job 
Another limitation of the database used is that many of the jobs were held either by men or 
by women, and thus these jobs help to estimate the role of sex segregation but not the 
gender wage differential within jobs. For this reason, we replicated the analysis only using 
integrated jobs with at least three workers9. The third and fourth columns of Table 7 
include the direct, indirect, and total effects on the wage gap of more women taking on 
responsibility within each establishment for this restricted dataset. 
The results obtained present some qualitative differences when compared to the 
estimations for integrated and non-integrated jobs. Specifically, we found that a greater 
                                                             
9 These results are available from the authors on request. 
24 
 
proportion of female supervisors did neither significantly influence the effects of 
establishment segregation on the wage gap nor significantly change the impact of 
occupational segregation within each establishment on the wage difference by gender for 
supervisors. However, when there are more female supervisors, the wage difference due to 
occupational segregation significantly decreases among non-supervisors by 3.5%. As 
expected, women´s access to  supervisory jobs can only improve women´s relative wages 
within jobs in which there are male and female workers, which may explain this result. 
Despite these qualitative differences, once again, a greater proportion of female supervisors 
in each establishment directly increases the wage difference between men and women by 
97.2% for supervisors and by 30.2% for non-supervisors. When there are more female 
supervisors, the gender wage differential as a whole decreases by only 1.6% for supervisors, 
but increases by 18.3% for non-supervisors. 
5.3 The effect of the existence of supervisors within an establishment 
In the sample of workers obtained from the database used in this paper, 23.9% of workers 
were employed in establishments without supervisory jobs. Perhaps, we cannot observe 
supervisors within these establishments because they have a horizontal hierarchy, but it is 
also possible that no supervisors in these establishment were surveyed. If so, it would not 
be possible to determine the proportion of female supervisors in such establishments. 
Thus, we restricted the sample to integrated jobs with at least three workers and at least 1 
supervisor10. Using this sub-sample, the fifth and the sixth columns of Table 7 include the 
estimated direct, indirect, and total effects on the wage gap of a greater proportion of 
female supervisors within each establishment. 
As expected, the results for supervisors in this section are the same as those obtained in the 
previous section. This is because the additional criterion used in this analysis did not 
change the sample of supervisors used in the previous section. Regarding non-supervisors, 
a significant difference was found in these estimations. In particular, a greater proportion 
of female supervisors does not significantly affect the impact of occupational segregation 
within each establishment on their wage gap. The remaining results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those included in the fourth column of Table 7. Once again, a 
greater proportion of female supervisors significantly increases the wage gap among non-
supervisors by 38% (direct effect). In total, a higher proportion of female supervisors 
increases the wage gap by 24.5% among non-supervisors. 
                                                             
10These results are available from the authors on request. 
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6. Conclusions 
Previous empirical studies have shown that the women's access to managerial positions has 
decreased the gender wage gap among workers below them. Sociologists and economists 
have provided different explanations for this result, including women´s lower taste for 
discrimination, female networks of friendship, or homophilous preferences among others. 
However, most studies have not taken into account that the workers´ choice of managerial 
jobs can be endogenous. In fact, we observe that those workers with the worst 
unobservable characteristics are chosen to be supervisors in the Spanish labour market. 
Then, a greater proportion of women among supervisors would leave the best women 
among non supervisors. It would explain that standard regressions obtain a lower gender 
wage difference for workers without supervisory jobs in those establishment with a greater 
proportion of female supervisors. For this reason, previous results could be biased. Thus, 
we estimated a switching model for supervisors and for non-supervisors for the Spanish 
labour market. This model separated the effect of a greater proportion of female 
supervisors on the difference between men and women regarding the likelihood of 
choosing a supervisory job from the effect of women accessing this type of job on the 
gender wage gap. 
Our findings show that a higher proportion of female supervisors in each establishment 
increases the probability of women obtaining a supervisory position more than the 
probability of men obtaining that position. This effect is stronger in those jobs with a 
higher proportion of women. Substantial theoretical and institutional literature supports 
these results and shows that women are more likely to be promoted to a particular job level 
when there is already a higher proportion of women at this level. This is especially the case 
for decision-making positions (Bell, 2005). Nevertheless, women´s access to jobs with 
greater authority does not help to narrow the gender wage gap at their level or among their 
subordinate workers. This result is consistent with Jacobs´ (1992) notion of “title 
inflation”, that is, the reclassification of non-managerial workers as managers with little 
change in authority or wages. In this case, a nominal increase in the proportion of female 
supervisors has a limited effect on the gender wage gap. 
Our estimations also suggest an alternative explanation for the observed limited impact of 
women´s power. In particular, we found that better access among women to supervisory 
jobs and a greater proportion of women within each establishment significantly increases 
the probability of holding a supervisory job. A possible explanation for this is the existence 
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of women-friendly firms. These types of firms may have a higher proportion of women 
and thus may have a greater proportion of female supervisors. Although this interpretation 
may seem hopeful in relation to women´s careers, female supervisors will not be able to 
reduce the gender wage difference within the same establishment if there are no male 
workers in their firm. This may explain why there is no association between women´s 
representation in supervisory jobs in each establishment and the wage difference when we 
take into account the endogeneity of job allocations. 
Although equal opportunity and equal treatment laws dominated political agendas in the 
past, the imposition of gender quotas or gender parity in top positions has replaced them. 
For example, Norway passed a law in 2006 requiring every public corporation to have a 
board of directors that is at least 40 % female (The Guardian, 2006).Similarly, a EU 
Directive published in November 2002 require EU corporate boards to set a “minimum 
objective” for the “underrepresented” sex to hold at least 40 per cent of the non-executive 
director positions on a corporate board Coleman et al. (2013). Promoting or hiring more 
women to top and influential positions is intended to have a direct impact on female 
employment and wages and an indirect impact, since female decision-makers might may 
hire more women for subordinate positions and pay them better wages. Our results suggest 
that the potential impact of these policies on the gender wage gap may be limited, at least 
in the short term. 
The unavailability of data on top managers or other managerial positions in each 
organization may have driven our results. In fact, we only have data on supervisors whose 
power is lower than that of managers. Some people identified as non-supervisors in our 
sample (e.g., doctors) may wield more authority in some cases than those counted as 
supervisors within the same establishment (e.g., administrative service managers in doctors´ 
offices). Nevertheless, recent studies have found that women´s access to managerial 
positions narrows the wage gap, but this effect decreases with managers´ positions within 
the hierarchical ladder (Hirsch, 2013). In any case, our results suggest that the estimations 
conducted in these kinds of study may well be biased if they do not take into account that 
the workers´ choice of managerial positions is endogenous. Specifically, this paper 
proposes an alternative methodology for those cases where a randomized experiment 
cannot be used to estimate the effects of more female supervisors on the gender wage gap 
in order to address this endogeneity problem. 
References 
27 
 
Amuedo Dorantes C, De la Rica S (2006) The role of segregation and pay structure on the 
gender wage gap: Evidence from matched employer-employee data for Spain. 
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 5(1) Article 10: 1-32. 
Bagues MF, Esteve-Volart B (2007) Can gender parity break the glass ceiling? Evidence 
from a repeated randomized experiment. FEDEA Working Paper nº 2007-15. 
Baron JN (1991) Organizational evidence of ascription in labour markets. In Cornwall, 
R.R. and Wunnava, P.V. (eds) New Approaches to Economic and Social Analysis of 
Discrimination. Prager, New York. 
Baron JN, Mittman BS, Newman, AE (1991) Targets of opportunity organizational and 
environmental determinants of gender integration within the California Civil Service, 
1979-1985.American  Journal of Sociology 96: 1362-1985. 
Becker G (1957) The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Bell L A (2005) Women-led firms and the gender gap in top executive jobs. IZA 
Discussion Paper Nº 1689. 
Broder IE (1993) Review of NSF economics proposals: Gender and institutional patterns. 
American Economic Review 83(4): 964-970. 
Carrington WJ, Troske KR (1995) Gender segregation in small firms. Journal of Human 
Resources 30: 503-533. 
Cohen LE, Broschak JP, Haveman HA (1998) And then, there were more? The effect of 
organizational sex composition on the hiring and promotion of managers. American 
Sociological Review 63: 711-727. 
Cohen PN, Huffman ML (2007) Working for the woman? Female managers and the 
gender wage gap. American Sociological Review 72: 681-704. 
Coleman J, Martínez C, Röhsler E, Turnbull J (2013) Board minimum quotas for women: 
Where would male gender discrimination start? Discrimination and Equality Law 
Committee Newsletter, June. 
Correll SJ (2001) Gender and the career choice process: The role of biased self-
assessments. American Journal of Sociology 106: 1691-1730. 
28 
 
Correll, SJ (2004) Constraints into preferences: Gender, status, and emerging career 
aspirations. American Sociological Review 69: 93-113. 
CotterDA, De Fiore J, Hermsen JM, Kowalewski BM, Vanneman R (1997) All women 
benefit: The macro-level effect of occupational integration on gender earnings 
inequality. American Sociological Review 62: 714-734.  
Deaux K (1985) Sex and gender. Annual Review of Psychology 36: 49-81. 
Elkinawy S, Stater M (2011) Gender differences in executive compensation: variation with 
board gender composition and time. Journal of Economics and Business 63: 23-45. 
The Guardian (2006) In Norway, a Woman´s Place is in the Boardroom. 9 January 2006. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/jan/09/business.workandcareers Accessed 
02.04.08. 
Halpert JA, Wilson ML, Hickman JL (1993) Pregnancy as a source of bias in performance 
evaluations.Journal of Organizational Behavior 14: 649-663. 
Hirsch, B. (2013): The impact of female managers on the gender pay gap: Evidence from 
linked employer-employee data for Germany. Economic Letters 119(3): 348-350. 
Hultin, M., Szulkin, R. (2003): Mechanisms of inequality: Unequal access to organizational 
power and the gender wage gap. European Sociological Review 19: 143-159. 
Ibarra, H. (1992): Homophily and differential returns: Sex differences in network structure 
and access in an advertising firm. Administrative Science Quarterly 37: 422-447. 
Jacobs, JA (1992) Women´s entry into management: Trends in earnings, authority and 
values among salaried managers. Administrative Science Quarterly 37: 282-301. 
Kanter, RM (1977) Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
Marini M (1989) Sex differences in earnings in the United States. Annual Review of 
Sociology 15: 343-380. 
McPherson M, Smith-Lovin L, Cook JM (2001) Birds of a feather: Homophily in social 
networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27: 415-444. 
Merton RK (1940) Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. Social Forces 18: 560-568. 
29 
 
Mun E (2010) Sex typing of jobs in hiring: Evidence from Japan. Social Forces 88(5): 1999-
2026. 
Nelson RL, Bridges WP (1999) Legalizing Gender Inequality: Courts, Markets, and 
Unequal Pay for Women in America. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Petersen T, Saporta I (2004) The opportunity structure for discrimination. American 
Journal of Sociology 109: 852-901. 
Phelps ES (1972) The statistical theory of racism and sexism. American Economic Review 
62: 659-661. 
Polavieja JG (2012) Socially embedded investments: Explaining gender differences in job-
specific skills. American Journal of Sociology 118(3): 592-634. 
Reskin BF (1993) Sex segregation in the workplace. Annual Review of Sociology 19: 241-
270. 
Reskin BF, Bielby DD (2005) A sociological perspective on gender and career outcomes. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1): 71-86. 
Ridgeway CL, Correll SJ (2004) Unpacking the gender system: A theoretical perspective on 
gender beliefs and social relations. Gender and Society 18(4): 510-531. 
Ridgeway CL (1997) Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: Considering 
employment. American Sociological Review 62: 218-235. 
Ridgeway CL, Erickson KG (2000) Creating and spreading status beliefs. American Journal 
of Sociology 106: 579-615. 
Rute-Cardoso A, Winter-Ebmer, R (2010) Female-led firms and gender wage policies. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 64: 143-163. 
Shenhav Y, Haberfeld Y (1992) Organizational demography and inequality. Social Forces 
71: 123-143. 
Tomaskovic-Devey D, Skaggs S (2002) Sex segregation, labour process organization, and 
gender earning inequalities. American Journal of Sociology 108: 102-128. 
Young IM (1994) Gender as seriality: Thinking about women as a social collective. Signs 
19: 713-738. 
